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NOTES & COMMENTS 
Deflategate Pumped Up: Analyzing the 
Second Circuit’s Decision and the NFL 
Commissioner’s Authority 
JOSH MANDEL* 
Deflategate was one of the most controversial scandals 
in NFL history, and while many became fascinated due to 
their love of football, Deflategate was ultimately rooted in 
law. NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell suspended Tom 
Brady, the legendary quarterback for the New England Pa-
triots, for four games for engaging in “conduct detrimental 
to the integrity of and public confidence in the game of pro-
fessional football.” More specifically, Goodell suspended 
Brady because he was generally aware of Patriots staff de-
flating footballs prior to the 2015 AFC Championship game, 
and because he failed to cooperate with the investigation 
into the deflated footballs. 
Commissioner Goodell controversially elected to act as 
the arbitrator in Brady’s challenge to the four-game suspen-
sion, which Goodell affirmed in his arbitration award. 
Thereafter, Brady successfully petitioned the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York to va-
cate Goodell’s arbitration award. Nonetheless, the 544-day 
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Deflategate saga ended after the Second Circuit reinstated 
Goodell’s award in a 2–1 decision and denied Brady’s sub-
sequent request for en banc review. Because two federal 
judges ruled in favor of Brady, while two others ruled in fa-
vor of Goodell and the NFL, this Note acts as the tiebreaker, 
wherein each issue on appeal is reevaluated and discussed 
under controlling arbitration and labor law. 
Upon closer examination, Deflategate presents a num-
ber of important questions about the scope and fairness of 
the NFL Commissioner’s authority. Should the NFL Com-
missioner have the authority to elect himself as the arbitra-
tor in a challenge to his prior disciplinary decision? Should 
the NFL Commissioner have the authority to suspend, or ter-
minate the contract of, any player who engages in “conduct 
detrimental” to the NFL, despite the “conduct detrimental” 
standard holding no concrete definition and being subject to 
the unilateral interpretation of the NFL Commissioner? 
How far can and should such a standard be stretched? Is 
such a standard inherently fair simply because a court 
deems it so?  
While this Note begins with the discussion outlined 
above—acting as the tiebreaker in the 2–2 split among fed-
eral judges—this Note then focuses more broadly on the con-
tractual rights afforded to and enjoyed by the NFL Commis-
sioner. In doing so, this Note explores the provisions in the 
2011 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement that many be-
lieve grants the NFL Commissioner too much authority, and 
discusses ways in which the NFL Players Association and 
the NFL can come to an agreement in limiting such authority 
as the negotiations for the 2021 Collective Bargaining 
Agreement soon approaches. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 830 
I. WHAT IS DEFLATEGATE? ............................................... 832 
A. The AFC Championship Game ................................ 832 
B. The Wells Report and the Suspension ...................... 833 
C. Brady’s Appeal......................................................... 835 
D. The Arbitration......................................................... 837 
2018] DEFLATEGATE PUMPED UP 829 
 
1. FACTUAL ISSUES .................................................. 837 
2. PROCEDURAL ISSUES ........................................... 838 
II. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE RICHARD 
BERMAN’S DECISION ..................................................... 839 
A. Notice ....................................................................... 840 
B. Examining Jeff Pash ................................................ 842 
C. The Wells Report Investigative Notes ...................... 843 
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION ................................. 844 
A. Majority.................................................................... 844 
1. NOTICE ................................................................ 845 
2. EXAMINING JEFF PASH ........................................ 849 
3. THE WELLS REPORT INVESTIGATIVE NOTES ....... 850 
B. Dissent...................................................................... 850 
IV. BREAKING THE 2–2 TIE .................................................. 851 
A. Governing Labor and Arbitration Law .................... 852 
B. Article 46’s Provisions ............................................. 853 
C. The Standard NFL Player Contract ......................... 854 
D. Notice ....................................................................... 854 
1. SUSPENSION OR FINE ........................................... 854 
2. ANALOGIZING DEFLATING FOOTBALLS TO STEROID 
USE ...................................................................... 855 
3. PUNISHMENT FOR SPECIFIC CONDUCT ................. 857 
4. DISCIPLINE FOR PROVIDING INDUCEMENTS AND 
REWARDS ........................................................... 859 
E. Examining Jeff Pash ................................................ 861 
F. The Wells Report Investigative Notes ...................... 863 
G.  Brady’s Request for En Banc Review ...................... 864 
H. Commentary to the Second Circuit’s Majority 
Opinion .................................................................... 865 
V. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE NFL COMMISSIONER’S 
AUTHORITY .................................................................... 866 
A. The Power of Article 46 ........................................... 866 
B. Looking to the 2021 CBA ......................................... 871 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 879 
 
 
830 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:827 
 
INTRODUCTION 
New England Patriots (“Patriots”) quarterback Tom Brady is a 
living football legend, considered by many to be the greatest quar-
terback of all time. His achievements on the gridiron are endless: at 
the close of the 2017 National Football League (“NFL”) regular sea-
son, Brady had thrown for 66,159 yards, 488 touchdowns, and just 
160 career interceptions.1 Yet, despite his unquestioned greatness, 
one interception would forever associate Brady with the most con-
troversial NFL scandal to date.  
The interception in question occurred on January 18, 2015, when 
the Patriots defeated the Indianapolis Colts (“Colts”) in the Ameri-
can Football Conference (“AFC”) Championship game.2 During the 
second quarter, Colts linebacker D’Qwell Jackson intercepted 
Brady’s pass.3 During halftime, the game referees tested the air pres-
sure on twelve of the Patriots’ footballs after becoming aware that 
the footballs might have been underinflated.4 The referees found that 
eleven of the twelve balls were, in fact, underinflated,5 prompting 
the 544-day scandal known as “Deflategate.”6 
A subsequent investigative report (“the Wells Report”) into the 
deflated footballs was published.7 The Wells Report concluded that 
                                                                                                             
 1 New England Patriots, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.nfl.com/
player/tombrady/2504211/careerstats (last visited Feb. 25, 2018). 
 2 ASSOCIATED PRESS, Tom Brady Carries Pats to Rout of Colts, Claims Sixth 
Super Bowl Trip, ESPN (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.espn.com/nfl/game?gameId=
400749520. 
 3 John Breech, Colts LB D’Qwell Jackson Basically Started Deflategate on 
Accident, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-
football/24984712/did-colts-lb-dqwell-jackson-start-deflategate-on-accident. 
 4 Mark Sandritter, NFL Determines Patriots Used Deflated Footballs Dur-
ing AFC Championship, Per Report, SBNATION (Jan. 20, 2015, 11:09 PM), 
http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2015/1/20/7864117/patriots-deflated-footballs-nfl-
new-england-bill-belichick. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Alex Reimer, Deflategate Officially Ended 544 Days After It Started, but 
We Can’t Stop Talking About it, SBNATION, http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2015/
8/31/9213261/deflategate-timeline-tom-brady-roger-gooddell-patriots/in/762215
4 (last updated Feb. 5, 2017, 12:45 PM) [hereinafter Deflategate Officially 
Ended]. 
 7 See generally THEODORE V. WELLS, JR. ET AL., PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, 
WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT CONCERNING FOOTBALLS 
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it was “more probable than not” that Brady was “generally aware” 
of misconduct committed by Patriots employees in relation to the 
deflation of the footballs.8 As a result, NFL Commissioner Roger 
Goodell suspended Brady for the first four games of the following 
2015–2016 NFL regular season because Brady had engaged in “con-
duct detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in” the 
NFL.9 Goodell later announced that he would elect to serve as the 
arbitrator in Brady’s appeal.10 
Goodell upheld the suspension in his arbitration award.11 There-
after, Brady petitioned the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York to vacate Goodell’s arbitration 
award, which was ultimately granted by Judge Richard Berman.12 
The NFL appealed Judge Berman’s decision to the Second Circuit, 
where Goodell’s arbitration award was reinstated.13 On July 13, 
2016, Brady’s petition for a Second Circuit en banc rehearing was 
denied.14 
Because two federal judges ruled in favor of Brady and two oth-
ers ruled in favor of the NFL, this Note analyzes the conflicting 
views between the courts, and discusses which views were more in 
line with legal standards and case law. In other words, this Note an-
alyzes, and thus predicts, which way the Second Circuit en banc 
                                                                                                             
USED DURING THE AFC CHAMPIONSHIP GAME ON JANUARY 18, 2015 (2015), 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Deflategate.pdf. 
 8 Id. at 2.   
 9 NFL releases statement on Patriots’ violations, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE: 
NEWS, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000492190/article/nfl-releases-
statement-on-patriots-violations (updated May 11, 2015, 8:48 PM). 
 10 Jonathan Clegg, Goodell Appoints Himself Arbitrator of Brady Appeal, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 15, 2015, 11:23 AM), http://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/goodell-appoints-himself-arbitrator-of-brady-appeal-1431703420. 
 11 Roger Goodell, National Football League, Final Decision on Article 46 
Appeal of Tom Brady 20 (July 28, 2015), https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/
2015/07/07282015-final-decision-tom-brady-appeal.pdf. 
 12 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players 
Ass’n (NFL Mgmt. Council I), 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 13 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players 
Ass’n (NFL Mgmt. Council II), 820 F.3d 527, 532 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 14 Alex Reimer, Tom Brady’s DeflateGate Appeal is Rejected, Suspension 
Stands, SBNATION (July 13, 2016, 9:45 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2016/
7/13/11779840/tom-brady-deflategate-appeal-rejected. 
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panel would have decided if it had granted Brady’s request for a 
rehearing. 
Deflategate was just one example of the NFL Commissioner’s 
broad disciplinary and governing authority. Following the detailed 
discussion of Deflategate, this Note addresses the provisions of the 
NFL and NFLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) that 
grant the NFL Commissioner authority, which many consider far 
too broad and unfair to players. This Note offers an eye-opening ex-
ample, wherein the NFL Commissioner, under the relevant authority 
in the CBA, could suspend, or terminate the contract of, a player for 
engaging in constitutionally-protected behavior. Finally, in an at-
tempt to limit the Commissioner’s authority, this Note offers sug-
gestions and recommendations to the NFLPA and NFL (including 
Roger Goodell himself) in advance of the inevitable collective bar-
gaining to follow the expiration of the current CBA in 2021. 
This Note begins in Part I with a detailed background of the facts 
in Deflategate. Part II explains Judge Berman’s reasons for vacating 
Goodell’s arbitration award. Part III explains the reasoning of the 
Second Circuit majority and dissenting opinions. Part IV analyzes 
all three judicial opinions under controlling legal principles, thereby 
predicting what the Second Circuit en banc panel, if it had granted 
rehearing, would have considered and held. Finally, Part V exam-
ines the NFL and NFLPA CBA and addresses relevant concerns 
about the NFL Commissioner’s power. 
I. WHAT IS DEFLATEGATE? 
A. The AFC Championship Game 
On January 18, 2015, the Patriots played against the Colts in the 
AFC Championship game.15 During the second quarter of the game, 
Patriots quarterback Tom Brady threw a pass that was intercepted 
by Colts linebacker D’Qwell Jackson.16 Jackson returned to the 
Colts sideline with the ball in hand and ultimately an equipment staff 
member informed Colts head coach Chuck Pagano that the ball felt 
underinflated.17 After Coach Pagano notified the appropriate NFL 
personnel, the game referees tested the pounds per square inch 
                                                                                                             
 15 ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 2. 
 16 Breech, supra note 3. 
 17 Id. 
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(“psi”) levels of the Patriots’ and Colts’ footballs.18 The referees 
found that all four of the Colts’ footballs were within the NFL’s per-
missible psi range of 12.5 to 13.5,19 while eleven out of twelve of 
the Patriots’ footballs were deflated to a psi below 12.5.20 The Pa-
triots won the game handily, with a score of 45–7,21 and eventually 
went on to win the Super Bowl by beating the Seattle Seahawks in 
historic fashion.22 
On January 23, 2015, Goodell released the NFL’s first statement 
concerning what quickly became dubbed “Deflategate” by sports 
media.23 In the statement, Goodell notified the public that the NFL 
was “conducting an investigation as to whether the footballs used 
in . . . [the] AFC Championship Game complied with the specifica-
tions that are set forth in . . . Playing Rule 2, Section 1, which re-
quires that the ball be inflated to between 12.5 and 13.5 [psi].”24 
Goodell then explained that NFL Executive Vice President Jeff Pash 
and Ted Wells of the law firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & 
Garrison (“Paul, Weiss”) would lead the investigation.25 
B. The Wells Report and the Suspension 
The 243-page Wells Report was published on May 6, 2015.26 In 
the report, Ted Wells found that it was more probable than not that 
Patriots equipment assistant John Jastremski and Patriots locker 
room attendant Jim McNally deliberately deflated footballs, and that 
                                                                                                             
 18 See Sandritter, supra note 4. Interestingly, NFL policy allows for each team 
to provide their own footballs for a game––and Tom Brady led the charge to im-
plement this policy. See Dana Hunsinger Benbow, How Tom Brady Helped 
Change Rule for Pre-Game Care of Footballs, USA TODAY SPORTS (Jan. 26, 
2015, 6:20 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2015/01/26/tom-
brady-deflategate-peyton-manning-rule-change-nfl/22372835/. 
 19 WELLS, JR. ET AL., supra note 7, at 1. See generally Rulebook: Rule 2: The 
Ball, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/image/
rulebook/pdfs/5_2013_Ball.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2018). 
 20 Sandritter, supra note 4. 
 21 ASSOCIATED PRESS, supra note 2. 
 22 See Deflategate Officially Ended, supra note 6. 
 23 NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE: COMMUNICATIONS, NFL STATEMENT (2015), 
https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/1-23-15-nfl-statement-2.pdf. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See generally WELLS, JR. ET AL., supra note 7. 
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“it [was] more probable than not that [Brady] was at least generally 
aware of the inappropriate activities of McNally and Jastremski.”27 
The investigative team relied on the following in reaching its 
conclusion: (1) text messages between McNally and Jastremski;28 
(2) the unusual relationship between Brady and Jastremski follow-
ing the AFC Championship Game;29 (3) the low likelihood that an 
equipment assistant and a locker room attendant would deflate foot-
balls without the star quarterback’s approval;30 and (4) Brady’s pub-
lic acknowledgement that he prefers game balls at a lower psi level, 
as well as his involvement in the 2006 rule change regarding how 
teams prepare footballs during road games.31 It was also noted in the 
Wells Report that, upon request, Brady declined to provide texts, 
emails, or any documents and electronic information relevant to the 
investigation.32 
On May 11, 2015, the NFL punished Brady for his role in De-
flategate.33 NFL Executive President Troy Vincent wrote a letter to 
Brady, stating that “pursuant to the authority of the Commissioner 
under Article 46 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and 
[Brady’s] NFL Player Contract,” Brady was to be suspended with-
out pay for the first four games of the 2015–2016 regular season.34 
In his letter to Brady, Vincent explained that 
the [Wells] report established that there is substantial 
and credible evidence to conclude you were at least 
generally aware of the actions of the Patriots’ em-
ployees involved in the deflation of the footballs and 
that it was unlikely that their actions were done with-
out your knowledge. Moreover, the report documents 
your failure to cooperate fully and candidly with the 
                                                                                                             
 27 Id. at 2. 
 28 See id. at 4–7. 
 29 See id. at 18. 
 30 See id. at 19. 
 31 See id. 
 32 It is important to note that Brady’s refusal to provide the requested infor-
mation was not material to the conclusions made in the Wells Report. See id. at 
21. 
 33 Deflategate Officially Ended, supra note 6. 
 34 Troy Vincent’s Letter to Tom Brady, ESPN (May 12, 2015), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/12873455/troy-vincent-letter-tom-brady. 
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investigation, including by refusing to produce any 
relevant electronic evidence (emails, texts, etc.) . . . . 
Your actions . . . clearly constitute conduct detri-
mental to the integrity of and public confidence in the 
game of professional football.35 
C. Brady’s Appeal 
Brady formally appealed his suspension on May 14, 2015.36 
Later that day, Goodell announced that he would serve as the arbi-
trator in Brady’s appeal.37 Such a decision was unexpected given 
Goodell’s usual practice of appointing independent arbitrators for 
high-profile appeals,38 and the fact that Goodell decided to hold an 
independent investigation (i.e., the Wells Report). 
Brady, represented by the NFL Players Association (“NFLPA”) 
and New York attorney Jeffrey Kessler,39 filed a number of motions 
requesting that (1) Goodell recuse himself as arbitrator, (2) the NFL 
produce Commissioner Goodell, NFL Executive Vice President 
Troy Vincent, NFL Executive Vice President Jeff Pash, and Ted 
Wells as witnesses at Brady’s arbitration, and (3) the NFL produce 
“[a]ll documents created, obtained, or reviewed by NFL investiga-
tors (including Mr. Wells and his investigative team at the Paul, 
Weiss firm and NFL security personnel) in connection with the Pa-
triots Investigation (including all notes, summaries, or memoranda 
describing or memorializing any witness interviews).”40 
Goodell released a letter to the public on June 2, 2015, where he 
explained his reasons for denying Brady’s request for Goodell’s 
recusal as arbitrator.41 In short, the letter explained that the CBA 
                                                                                                             
 35 Id. (emphasis added). 
 36 Deflategate Officially Ended, supra note 6. 
 37 Clegg, supra note 10. 
 38 See id. 
 39 See Jeffrey L. Kessler, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, http://www.win-
ston.com/en/who-we-are/attorneys/kessler-jeffrey-l.html (last visited Feb 25, 
2018). 
 40 Motions for Tom Brady at 2, Re: Tom Brady Article 46 Appeal, http://thes-
portsesquires.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/NFLPA-Brady-Motion-to-
Compel-Witnesses-and-Discovery.pdf. 
 41 Letter from Roger Goodell to NFLPA Regarding Brady Appeal, NAT’L 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE: NEWS, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000495253/
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“provides that ‘at his discretion,’ the Commissioner may serve as 
hearing officer in ‘any appeal’ involving conduct detrimental to the 
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional foot-
ball.”42 
In this letter, Goodell responded to three arguments Brady made 
for Goodell’s recusal. First, in response to Brady’s argument that 
Goodell should recuse himself because of NFL Executive Vice Pres-
ident Troy Vincent’s role in deciding Brady’s discipline (i.e., that 
Vincent, rather than Goodell, disciplined Brady), Goodell stated that 
he never ordered Vincent to discipline Brady.43 Instead, Goodell ex-
plained that Vincent was authorized to inform Brady of the suspen-
sion and the reasons supporting the discipline in a written letter.44 
Second, in response to Brady’s argument that Goodell should recuse 
himself because he was a “necessary” or “central” witness in the 
appeal proceeding, Goodell simply denied this allegation.45 Third, 
in response to Brady’s argument that Goodell should recuse himself 
because he had prejudged the matter, Goodell stated that, despite his 
public appreciation for the work done by Ted Wells and the Paul, 
Weiss firm, he was not “wedded to their conclusion or to their as-
sessment of the facts.”46 Goodell then expressed that he had an open 
mind going into the arbitration.47 
Almost three weeks later, on June 22, 2015, Goodell denied 
Brady’s additional requests: that NFL Executive Vice President Jeff 
Pash testify, and that the investigative notes used in drafting the 
Wells Report be provided to Brady.48 In support of his denials, 
Goodell explained that Pash did not play a substantial role in the 
investigation, and that the investigative notes played no role in 
Goodell’s decision to suspend Brady.49 
                                                                                                             
article/letter-from-roger-goodell-to-nflpa-regarding-brady-appeal (updated June 
2, 2015, 3:04 PM). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See id. 
 45 See id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 49 Id. 
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D. The Arbitration 
The arbitration appeal hearing was held on June 23, 2015.50 Five 
days later, Goodell published his arbitration award confirming 
Brady’s suspension.51 The award addressed a number of issues, but 
only the following four are relevant for this Note. The first two is-
sues are factual, while the second two are procedural. 
1. FACTUAL ISSUES 
Goodell first addressed Brady’s role in the deflation of the foot-
balls.52 Goodell’s ultimate conclusion was that “Brady knew about, 
approved of, consented to, and provided inducements and rewards 
in support of a scheme by which, with Mr. Jastremski’s support, Mr. 
McNally tampered with the game balls.”53 Goodell relied on the fol-
lowing: (1) Brady’s relationship with Jastremski and McNally; (2) 
the frequency, duration, and location of Brady’s conversations with 
Jastremski and McNally; (3) the Wells Report investigators’ inter-
views; (4) and text messages between Jastremski and McNally in 
reference to Brady and footballs.54 
Next, Goodell looked to Brady’s level of cooperation with the 
Wells Report investigation, initially noting that 
[t]he most significant new information that emerged 
in connection with the appeal was evidence that on 
or about March 6, 2015—the very day he was inter-
viewed by Mr. Wells and his investigative team—
Mr. Brady instructed his assistant to destroy the cell-
phone that he had been using since early November 
2014, a period that included the AFC Championship 
Game and the initial weeks of the subsequent inves-
tigation . . . At the time that he arranged for its de-
struction, Mr. Brady knew that Mr. Wells and his 
                                                                                                             
 50 Goodell, supra note 11, at 1. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See id. at 7–11. 
 53 Id. at 10 (emphasis added). 
 54 Id. at 7–11. 
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team had requested information from that cellphone 
in connection with their investigation.55 
As to these factual issues, Goodell ultimately found that 
(1) Mr. Brady participated in a scheme to tamper 
with the game balls after they had been approved by 
the game officials for use in the AFC Championship 
Game and (2) Mr. Brady willfully obstructed the in-
vestigation by, among other things, affirmatively ar-
ranging for destruction of his cellphone knowing that 
it contained potentially relevant information that had 
been requested by the investigators. All of this indis-
putably constitutes conduct detrimental to the integ-
rity of, and public confidence in, the game of profes-
sional football.56 
2. PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
Goodell then moved on to two procedural issues. First, Goodell 
addressed his decision to suspend Brady for four games, rather than 
to fine him.57 Goodell pointed out that “[n]o prior conduct detri-
mental proceeding is directly comparable to this one.”58 As a result, 
Goodell stated the following: 
In terms of the appropriate level of discipline, the 
closest parallel of which I am aware is the collec-
tively bargained discipline imposed for a first viola-
tion of the policy governing performance enhancing 
drugs; steroid use reflects an improper effort to se-
cure a competitive advantage in, and threatens the in-
tegrity of, the game. . . . [T]he first positive test for 
the use of [PEDs] has resulted in a four-game sus-
pension without the need for any finding of actual 
competitive effect.59 
                                                                                                             
 55 Id. at 1–2. 
 56 Id. at 13 (emphasis added). 
 57 See id. at 14. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 16. 
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Next, in response to Brady’s argument that he was not given no-
tice of possible discipline for his actions, Goodell noted that Brady 
was aware of or had notice with respect to the following: (1) that the 
authorized psi range for game balls was between 12.5 and 13.5; (2) 
that it is reasonable to believe that tampering with game balls could 
affect the integrity of, and public confidence in, the game of profes-
sional football; and (3) that destroying cell phones, which were es-
sential to investigators, would itself be deemed conduct detri-
mental.60 Goodell also pointed out that “the CBA-mandated stand-
ard NFL Player Contract, which Mr. Brady signed, makes clear and 
provides notice that, in the event of a finding of conduct detrimental, 
[Goodell] may ‘suspend Player for a period certain or indefi-
nitely.’”61 
II. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE RICHARD 
BERMAN’S DECISION 
Brady filed a petition to vacate Goodell’s arbitration award in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York.62 On September 3, 2015, presiding Judge Richard Berman 
ruled in favor of Brady, thereby vacating the four-game suspen-
sion.63 Judge Berman outlined the issues presented: 
(A) inadequate notice to Brady of both his potential 
discipline (four-game suspension) and his alleged 
misconduct; (B) denial of the opportunity for Brady 
to examine one of two lead investigators, namely 
NFL Executive Vice President . . . Jeff Pash; and (C) 
denial of equal access to investigative files, including 
witness interview notes.64 
                                                                                                             
 60 See id. at 18. 
 61 Id. For a detailed discussion about this relevant provision of the CBA-
mandated standard NFL Player Contract, see infra Part V. 
 62 NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 63 Id. at 449, 453. 
 64 Id. at 463. 
840 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:827 
 
A. Notice 
In response to Brady’s allegation of improper notice,65 Judge 
Berman analyzed four questions presented: (1) whether Brady was 
on notice that he could be suspended based on a comparison between 
deflating footballs and steroid use; (2) whether Brady was on notice 
he could be suspended for being generally aware of others’ miscon-
duct; (3) whether Brady was on notice his specific conduct could 
lead to a suspension; and (4) whether the CBA’s Article 46 conduct 
detrimental standard provided sufficient notice.66 
As to the first question presented,67 Judge Berman found that no 
NFL player who “had a general awareness of the inappropriate ball 
deflation activities of others or who schemed with others to let air 
out of footballs . . . and also had not cooperated in an ensuing inves-
tigation, reasonably could be on notice that their discipline would” 
be equal to that of a steroid user.68 In support of this finding, Judge 
Berman relied on oral arguments,69 the bargained-for Steroid Policy 
in the CBA,70 Ted Wells’ testimony,71 and former NFL Commis-
sioner Paul Tagliabue’s observation in the Bountygate72 matter.73 
Judge Berman then argued that Goodell violated the law of the 
shop74 because Goodell did not draw his award from the CBA, and 
instead “‘must have based his award on some body of thought, or 
feeling, or policy, or law that is outside [of the CBA].’”75 
                                                                                                             
 65 See id. at 463–70. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See id. at 465. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 463. 
 70 Id. at 464. 
 71 Id. at 464–65. 
 72 See generally Katherine Terrell, New Orleans Saints Bounty Scandal Time-
line, NOLA, http://www.nola.com/saints/index.ssf/2012/12/bounty_scandal_
timeline.html (updated Dec. 12, 2012, 9:11 AM). 
 73 NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 463, 465–66. 
 74 For more information on the arbitration principle of the “law of the shop,” 
see Jerome S. Rubenstein, Some Thoughts on Labor Arbitration, 49 MARQUETTE 
L. REV. 695, 698 (1966) (explaining that “[w]hen an arbitrator enforces a past 
practice [prevalent in the industry,] he is merely declaring the industrial ‘common 
law of the shop.’”). See also infra notes 165–169 and accompanying text. 
 75 NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 465. 
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As to the second question presented,76 Judge Berman empha-
sized that the “principal finding” in the Wells Report and Troy Vin-
cent’s suspension letter to Brady was that Brady was generally 
aware of others’ misconduct.77 Judge Berman then explained that 
“no NFL policy or precedent notifies players that they may be dis-
ciplined (much less suspended) for general awareness of misconduct 
by others.”78 Further, Judge Berman found that the NFL has never 
punished players before for Brady’s specific conduct.79 As a result, 
Judge Berman concluded that Goodell’s arbitration award violated 
the law of the shop because “Brady had no notice that such conduct 
was prohibited, or any reasonable certainty of potential discipline 
stemming from such conduct.”80 
As to the third question presented,81 Judge Berman found that 
Brady was not on notice that his conduct could lead to a suspension 
under the Competitive Integrity Policy.82 Judge Berman reasoned 
that Brady “had no legal notice of discipline under the Competitive 
Integrity Policy, which is . . . distributed solely to—and, therefore, 
provides notice to—‘Chief Executives, Club Presidents, General 
Managers, and Head Coaches,’ and not to players.”83 
As to the fourth and final question presented,84 Judge Berman 
concluded that Goodell’s use of the conduct detrimental standard in 
Article 46, rather than specific Player Policies, was “legally mis-
placed” as a basis for deciding Brady’s discipline.85 Further, he 
                                                                                                             
 76 Id. at 467. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See id. 
 80 Id.; see id. at 467 n.18. 
 81 Id. at 467–68. 
 82 NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 469. 
 83 Id. at 468–69. 
 84 Id. at 468–70. 
 85 Id. at 470. 
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pointed out an inconsistency, in that the past conduct of Adrian Pe-
terson86 and of Ray Rice87 could have been considered conduct det-
rimental, where in fact “[they] were disciplined . . . under the spe-
cific domestic violence policy . . . because an applicable specific 
provision within the Player Policies is better calculated to provide 
notice to a player than [the] general . . . ‘conduct detrimental.’”88 
B. Examining Jeff Pash 
Judge Berman found that the arbitration was fundamentally un-
fair because of Goodell’s decision to not require testimony from Jeff 
Pash, the NFL Executive Vice President who acted as the co-lead 
Wells Report investigator.89 Judge Berman acknowledged the broad 
discretion that arbitrators have with respect to admitting evidence 
into the arbitration.90 Nonetheless, Judge Berman held that Brady 
was “foreclosed from exploring . . . whether the . . . Investigation 
was truly ‘independent,’ and how and why [Pash] came to edit a 
supposedly independent investigation report.”91 
Judge Berman then looked generally to NFL arbitration prece-
dent, finding that “in Article 46 arbitration appeals, players must be 
afforded the opportunity to confront their investigators.”92 After 
comparing this matter to the Bountygate93 and Ray Rice94 matters 
(i.e., where all individuals associated with the investigation were 
compelled to testify), Judge Berman stated: “[g]iven Mr. Pash’s 
                                                                                                             
 86 See generally Conor Orr, Adrian Peterson Suspended Without Pay, NAT’L 
FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000430302/article/
adrian-peterson-suspended-without-pay-for-rest-of-14 (updated Nov. 18, 2014, 
5:38 PM). 
 87 See generally Ryan Wilson, Ray Rice Cut by Ravens, Indefinitely Banned 
by NFL Amid Video Fallout, CBS SPORTS (Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/ray-rice-cut-by-ravens-indefinitely-banned-
by-nfl-amid-video-fallout/. 
 88 NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 470. 
 89 Id. at 472. 
 90 Id. at 471 (citing Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth. v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 
283(GBD), 2013 WL 789642, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2013)). 
 91 Id. at 472. Interestingly, in his opinion, Judge Berman questioned the inde-
pendence of the Wells Report investigation by bolding or quoting the word “in-
dependent” seven times. See generally id. 
 92 Id. at 471. 
 93 See generally Terrell, supra note 72. 
 94 See generally Wilson, supra note 87. 
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very senior position in the NFL . . . and his designation as co-lead 
investigator with Ted Wells, it is logical that he would have valuable 
insight into the course and outcome of the Investigation and into the 
drafting and content of the Wells Report.”95 Accordingly, Judge 
Berman held that “[t]he issues known to Pash constituted ‘evidence 
plainly pertinent and material to the controversy,’ and [Goodell’s] 
refusal to hear such evidence warrants vacatur.”96 
C. The Wells Report Investigative Notes 
Judge Berman found prejudice against Brady when Goodell de-
nied him access to the Wells Report investigative notes.97 Judge 
Berman stated that “Brady was denied the opportunity to examine 
and challenge materials that may have led to his suspension and 
which likely facilitated Paul, Weiss attorneys’ cross-examination of 
him.”98 
Judge Berman focused primarily on one troubling fact: “Paul, 
Weiss acted as both alleged ‘independent’ counsel during the Inves-
tigation and also (perhaps inconsistently) as retained counsel to the 
NFL during the arbitration.”99 On this issue, Judge Berman further 
stated that 
Paul, Weiss uniquely was able to retain access to in-
vestigative files and interview notes which it had de-
veloped; was able to use them in direct and cross-
examination of Brady and other arbitration wit-
nesses; share them with NFL officials during the ar-
bitral proceedings; and, at the same time, withhold 
them from Brady.100 
This duality of roles led Judge Berman to believe that Goodell 
and Pash may have had “greater access to valuable impressions, in-
sights, and other investigative information which was not available 
                                                                                                             
 95 NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 471. 
 96 Id. at 472. 
 97 Id. at 473. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. (emphasis added). 
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to Brady.”101 As a result, Judge Berman concluded that Goodell’s 
decision was fundamentally unfair.102 
Judge Berman closed his opinion by vacating Goodell’s award, 
thereby overturning Brady’s four-game suspension.103 And, of 
course, one week after Judge Berman’s opinion was published, 
Brady threw four touchdowns in a 28–21 win over the Pittsburgh 
Steelers.104 
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
The NFL appealed Judge Berman’s vacatur to the Second Cir-
cuit.105 In a controversial 2-1 decision published on April 25, 2016, 
the Second Circuit ruled in favor of the NFL, thereby reinstating 
Goodell’s arbitration award.106 
A. Majority 
Judge Barrington Parker, joined by Judge Denny Chin, opened 
his majority opinion by explaining the general principle driving his 
findings: 
[A] federal court’s review of labor arbitration awards 
is narrowly circumscribed and highly deferential—
indeed, among the most deferential in the law. Our 
role is not to determine for ourselves . . . whether the 
suspension imposed by the Commissioner should 
have been for three games or five games or none at 
all. Nor is it our role to second-guess the arbitrator’s 
procedural rulings. Our obligation is limited to deter-
mining whether the arbitration proceedings and 
award met the minimum legal standards established 
by the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) 
[to] ensure that the arbitrator was “even arguably 
                                                                                                             
 101 Id. at 472. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 474. 
 104 ASSOCIATED PRESS, Tom Brady’s 4 Passing TDs, 3 to Rob Gronkowski, 
Highlight Pats’ Opening Win, ESPN (Sept. 11, 2015), http://www.espn.com/nfl/
recap?gameId=400791485. 
 105 NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527, 532 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 106 Id. at 527, 532. 
2018] DEFLATEGATE PUMPED UP 845 
 
construing or applying the contract and acting within 
the scope of his authority” and did not “ignore the 
plain language of the contract.” These standards do 
not require perfection in arbitration awards. Rather, 
they dictate that even if an arbitrator makes mistakes 
of fact or law, we may not disturb an award so long 
as he acted within the bounds of his bargained-for 
authority.107 
Under this principle, Judge Parker responded to the district 
court’s “three bases for overturning Brady’s suspension: (1) lack of 
adequate notice that deflation of footballs could lead to a four-game 
suspension, (2) the exclusion of testimony from Pash,” and (3) the 
refusal to provide Brady access to the Paul, Weiss investigative 
notes.108 
1. NOTICE 
With respect to notice, Judge Parker addressed five issues. Re-
garding the first of the five issues, Judge Berman found that Brady 
was only provided notice that his specific conduct could be disci-
plined under the Player Policies, “which are collected in a handbook 
distributed to all NFL players at the beginning of each season, [and] 
include a section entitled ‘Other Uniform/Equipment Viola-
tions.’”109 Further, Judge Berman reasoned that the Player Policies 
only provided that under the section entitled Other Uniform/Equip-
ment Violations, “[f]irst offenses will result in fines.”110 
Judge Parker found two flaws inherent in Judge Berman’s find-
ings. The initial flaw was pointed out during arbitration, where the 
NFLPA, on behalf of Brady, discredited its own argument by stating 
“we don’t believe [the Player Policy] applie[d] either, because there 
is nothing [in the Player Policy] about the balls.”111 Judge Parker 
agreed, finding that the Player Policies, and more specifically, the 
section entitled Other Uniform/Equipment Violations, “says nothing 
about tampering with, or the preparation of, footballs, and, indeed, 
                                                                                                             
 107 Id. at 532.  
 108 Id. at 537–38. 
 109 Id. at 538. 
 110 Id. at 539. 
 111 Id. at 538. 
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does not mention the words ‘tampering,’ ‘ball,’ or ‘deflation’ at 
all.”112 Conversely, Judge Parker noted that Article 46 authorized 
Goodell to discipline players for conduct believed to threaten the 
integrity of the game, and as such, there was “little difficulty in con-
cluding that the Commissioner’s decision to discipline Brady pursu-
ant to Article 46 was ‘plausibly grounded in the parties’ agreement,’ 
which is all the law requires.”113 
The next flaw Judge Parker noted within the first of five issues 
was that the 2014 Schedule of Fines makes clear that the fines re-
ferred to and relied upon by Judge Berman are only minimums.114 
The 2014 Schedule of Fines states that “other forms of discipline, 
including higher fines and suspension may also be imposed, based 
on the circumstances of the particular violation.”115 Judge Parker 
concluded that Goodell’s interpretation of the Player Policies and 
2014 Schedule of Fines was “at least ‘barely colorable,’ which, 
again, is all that the law requires.”116 
The second of the five notice issues that Judge Parker addressed 
was in relation to Goodell’s steroid comparison.117 Judge Parker 
stated that Goodell “was within his discretion in drawing a helpful, 
if somewhat imperfect, comparison” between deflating footballs and 
steroid use when considering the discipline imposed on Brady.118 
Judge Parker further explained: 
[i]f deference means anything, it means that the arbi-
trator is entitled to generous latitude in phrasing his 
conclusions. . . . While [Brady] may have been enti-
tled to notice of his range of punishment, it does not 
follow that he was entitled to advance notice of the 
analogies the arbitrator might find persuasive in se-
lecting a punishment within that range.119 
                                                                                                             
 112 Id. at 539. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 539–40. 
 118 Id. at 540–41. 
 119 Id. at 540. 
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In response to the dissent’s claim120 that vacatur is warranted 
because Goodell “failed to [analogize] a policy regarding 
stickum,”121 Judge Parker stated that “even if the fine for stickum is 
the most appropriate analogy to Brady’s conduct, nothing in the 
CBA or our case law demands that the arbitrator discuss comparable 
conduct merely because we find that analogy more persuasive than 
others.”122 Judge Parker insisted that although “the penalty meted 
out to Brady [may be] harsh,” vacatur was not warranted.123 As an 
important aside, Judge Parker noted that the CBA did not even re-
quire Goodell to provide an explanation for his discipline; rather, 
Goodell was free to suspend Brady without any analogy at all.124 
The third of the five notice issues that Judge Parker addressed 
was whether Brady was on notice that he could be suspended for 
being “generally aware” of others’ misconduct.125 Judge Parker split 
this issue twofold.126 First, in response to Judge Berman’s finding 
that there is no disciplinary precedent comparable to Brady’s (i.e., 
discipline for the conduct of deflating footballs), Judge Parker al-
leged that Judge Berman “misapprehend[ed] the record”––
Goodell’s award clearly stated that Brady’s discipline was con-
firmed because he “‘participated in a scheme to tamper with game 
balls’ and ‘willfully obstructed the investigation by . . . arranging 
for destruction of his cellphone.’”127 In other words, Brady was dis-
ciplined for reasons that Judge Berman omitted. 
Second, in response to Brady’s argument that Goodell was 
bound to the conclusions in the Wells Report, Judge Parker pointed 
to Article 46, which notably does not limit an arbitrator from reas-
sessing the factual basis for the discipline at issue.128 Judge Parker 
                                                                                                             
 120 See infra Section III.B. 
 121 For more information on what stickum is, see John Gennaro, San Diego 
Chargers: What Is “Stickum”, Anyway?, SBNATION (Oct. 22, 2012, 1:12 PM), 
https://www.boltsfromtheblue.com/2012/10/22/3539890/what-is-stickum-san-
diego-chargers (stickum is “a powder, paste, or aerosol spray” applied to players’ 
hands or gloves to improve their grip when catching or handling a football). 
 122 NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 540, 552.  
 123 Id. 
 124 See id. at 540–41. 
 125 See id. at 541–42. 
 126 See id. 
 127 Id. at 541 (quoting Goodell, supra note 11) (emphasis added). 
 128 See id. 
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made his point by noting that “[b]ecause the point of a hearing in 
any proceeding is to establish a complete factual record, it would be 
incoherent to both authorize a hearing and at the same time insist 
that no new findings or conclusions could be [made].”129 And, to 
Brady’s argument that the language used in Goodell’s award im-
properly implied his conduct was more severe than the findings in 
the Wells Report, Judge Parker found that “nothing in the CBA sug-
gests that [Goodell] was barred from concluding, based on new in-
formation generated during the hearing, that Brady’s conduct was 
more serious than was initially believed.”130 
The fourth of the five notice issues that Judge Parker addressed 
was whether Brady was on notice that he could be disciplined for 
non-cooperation in the Wells Report investigation.131 Judge Berman 
found that Goodell’s award could not be upheld because no player 
in NFL history had ever been disciplined for “alleged failure to co-
operate with—or even allegedly obstructing—an NFL investiga-
tion.”132 Brady also argued that he “had no notice that the destruc-
tion of the cell phone would even be at issue in the arbitration pro-
ceeding.”133 In response to both Brady and Judge Berman, Judge 
Parker explained that the NFL’s letter to Brady, which stated that he 
was suspended for reasons such as “failure to cooperate fully and 
candidly with the investigation, including by refusing to produce 
any relevant electronic evidence (emails, texts, etc.),” gave “clear 
notice [to Brady] that his cooperation with the investigation was a 
subject of significant interest.”134 Further, Judge Parker pointed out 
that the testimony of one of Brady’s expert witnesses regarding why 
Brady destroyed his cellphone suggested that Brady “had at least 
enough notice of the potential consequences of the cell phone de-
struction to retain an expert in advance of the arbitration.”135 Judge 
Parker also articulated that “any reasonable litigant would under-
stand that the destruction of evidence, revealed just days before the 
                                                                                                             
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 See id. at 542–44. 
 132 Id. at 542. 
 133 Id. at 543. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. 
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start of arbitration proceedings, would be an important issue,” and 
concluded that there was no fundamental unfairness as a result.136 
The last of the five notice issues that Judge Parker addressed was 
whether Brady was on notice that he could be suspended, rather than 
fined.137 In response to Judge Berman’s position that the Player Pol-
icies only provided Brady with notice that he could be fined and not 
suspended, Judge Parker found that Brady’s suspension was based 
on Article 46’s conduct detrimental standard, not the Player Poli-
cies.138 In other words, “Article 46 put [Brady] on notice prior to the 
AFC Championship Game that any action deemed by [Goodell] to 
be ‘conduct detrimental’ could lead to suspension.”139 
2. EXAMINING JEFF PASH 
Regarding Goodell’s denial to compel Jeff Pash’s testimony, 
Judge Parker concluded that Goodell’s decision fit “comfortably 
within [Goodell’s] broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence 
and raises no questions of fundamental fairness.”140 After acknowl-
edging the vast deference that arbitrators are afforded, Judge Parker 
pointed out that Pash’s testimony would cover whether the Wells 
Report investigation was truly “independent,” which was separate 
from the main issue: whether Brady engaged in conduct detrimental 
to the NFL.141 Judge Parker found that “[t]he CBA does not require 
an independent investigation, and nothing would have prohibited 
[Goodell] from using an in-house team to conduct the investigation. 
The [NFLPA] and [NFL] bargained for and agreed in the CBA on a 
structure that” made the NFL and Goodell responsible for both in-
vestigation and adjudication.142 
                                                                                                             
 136 Id. at 544. 
 137 Id. at 544–45. 
 138 See id. at 544. 
 139 Id. at 544–45. As explained infra in Section V.A., the Standard NFL Player 
Contract, which every player (including Brady) signs, also provides notice to 
players that the Commissioner is permitted to fine, suspend, and even terminate 
the contract of a player should the Commissioner reasonably judge that the 
player’s conduct was detrimental to the League. See infra Section V.A. 
 140 NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 546. 
 141 See id. at 545–46. 
 142 Id. at 546. 
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3. THE WELLS REPORT INVESTIGATIVE NOTES 
Judge Parker decided that Goodell’s refusal to allow Brady ac-
cess to the Wells Report investigative notes was fundamentally 
fair.143 Judge Parker clarified that Article 46 only required sharing 
of exhibits that the adverse parties intend to rely on.144 Given 
Goodell’s claim that he never used the investigative notes to deter-
mine Brady’s discipline, Judge Parker concluded that “[Goodell] 
was, at the very least, ‘arguably construing or applying the 
[CBA].’”145 
B. Dissent 
Second Circuit Chief Judge Robert Katzmann was the lone dis-
senter.146 Judge Katzmann only addressed two points: (1) that 
Goodell based his final decision on misconduct different from that 
originally charged; and (2) that Goodell instituted his own brand of 
industrial justice because of the failure to use stickum as the proper 
analogy for punishment.147 
With respect to his first point, Judge Katzmann stated that 
Goodell improperly based his arbitration award on misconduct that 
was different from the misconduct that influenced the initial four-
game suspension.148 Judge Katzmann focused on one of the reasons 
Goodell provided in his arbitration award—that “[Brady] provided 
inducements and rewards [to John Jastremski and Jim McNally for 
their efforts in deflating footballs].”149 But, Judge Katzmann noted 
that nowhere in the Wells Report was there a finding that “it was 
‘more probable than not’ that the gifts Brady provided [to Jastremski 
and McNally] were intended as rewards or advance payment for de-
flating footballs in violation of [NFL] rules.”150 In other words, 
Judge Katzmann alleged that the Wells Report failed to put Brady 
on notice “that he was found to have engaged in a quid pro quo”; 
                                                                                                             
 143 See id. at 546–57. 
 144 See id. at 546. 
 145 Id. at 547. 
 146 See id. at 549. 
 147 See id. at 549–554 (Katzmann, J., dissenting). 
 148 Id. at 550. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
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yet quid pro quo was one reason Goodell confirmed his initial dis-
cipline.151 
Judge Katzmann interestingly noted that Brady’s brief was quiet 
on this issue––this silence, according to Judge Katzmann, reflected 
the lack of notice.152 Judge Katzmann reasoned that if Brady had 
been aware that Goodell was going to focus on this alleged quid pro 
quo, then Brady may have been able to persuade Goodell to reverse 
his initial discipline.153 
Regarding his second point, Judge Katzmann reasoned that 
Goodell’s analogy comparing deflating footballs to using steroids, 
rather than to using stickum,154 reflected that the arbitration award 
was not based on Goodell’s interpretation of the CBA.155 A fine for 
using stickum would amount to $8,268—an amount much less than 
Brady’s loss of compensation for the four games he was suspended 
for.156 Judge Katzmann concluded that, with respect to Goodell’s 
analogy to steroid use, “[t]he lack of any meaningful explanation in 
[his] final written decision convinces me that [he] was doling out his 
own brand of industrial justice.”157 
IV. BREAKING THE 2–2 TIE 
In response to the Second Circuit’s 2–1 reversal of the district 
court’s ruling, University of New Hampshire Law Professor Mi-
chael McCann stated “you might say there were [four] federal 
judges that studied this case and [two] of them ruled for Brady, [two] 
of them ruled for the NFL.”158 Given such conflict, this Part de-
scribes controlling principles, and then applies them to the facts and 
                                                                                                             
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. at 551. 
 153 Id. 
 154 For more information on stickum, see John Gennaro, supra note 121. Judge 
Katzmann reasoned that stickum, “a substance that enhances a player’s grip,” was 
more similar to deflating footballs than using steroids because using stickum and 
deflating footballs both improve grip and are used without the permission of the 
referee. See NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 552 (Katzman, J., dissenting). 
 155 Id. at 553–54. 
 156 Id. at 553. 
 157 Id. at 553. 
 158 Tom Brady Must Serve ‘Deflategate’ Penalty, WCVB, 
http://www.wcvb.com/article/tom-brady-must-serve-deflategate-penalty/
8234240 (last updated Apr. 26, 2016, 5:18 AM). 
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issues in Deflategate to determine which of the conflicting views 
likely would have prevailed were an en banc rehearing granted. 
A. Governing Labor and Arbitration Law 
Because the issues in Deflategate involve rights under the NFL’s 
and NFLPA’s Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), § 301 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) governs.159 Judi-
cial review of an arbitration award under LMRA § 301 is “very lim-
ited.”160 A court is precluded “from resolving merits of parties’ labor 
disputes on the basis of its own factual determinations, no matter 
how erroneous the arbitrator’s decision.”161 The construction of the 
CBA and determination of any facts at issue, “however good, bad, 
or ugly,” are for the arbitrator—and only the arbitrator—to de-
cide.162  
Rather than interpreting the CBA or assessing the facts, the pur-
pose of judicial review of labor disputes is instead to determine if 
the arbitrator was “even arguably construing or applying the con-
tract and acting within the scope of his authority.”163 So long as the 
arbitrator’s decision draws “its essence from the [CBA]” and is not 
merely the arbitrator’s “own brand of industrial justice,” then the 
decision must be confirmed.164 
Although an arbitral decision must be drawn from the CBA, the 
arbitrator is also bound by what is referred to as the “common law 
of the shop”: “The labor arbitrator’s source of law is not confined to 
the express provisions of the [CBA], as the industrial common 
law—the practices of the industry and the shop—is equally a part of 
the [CBA] although not expressed in it.”165 It is accepted that the 
common law of the shop of professional football requires that play-
ers be provided “advance notice of prohibited conduct and potential 
                                                                                                             
 159 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2012); see Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Gar-
vey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001). 
 160 Garvey, 532 U.S. at 509. 
 161 Id. at 511. 
 162 Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 573 (2013). 
 163 United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). 
 164 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 
597 (1960). 
 165 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 
574, 581–82 (1960). 
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discipline.”166 As stated by former neutral NFL arbitrators, “ade-
quate notice is the fundamental concept in discipline cases,”167 and 
disciplinary programs “require[] that individuals subject to that pro-
gram understand, with reasonable certainty, what results will occur 
if they breach established rules.”168 
While judicial review of an arbitration award is limited, so is the 
deference afforded to it.169 The Federal Arbitration Act provides that 
a court may vacate an arbitration award “where the arbitrators . . . 
refus[ed] to hear evidence pertinent and material to the contro-
versy,”170 or “where there was evident partiality.”171 
B. Article 46’s Provisions 
Article 46, Section 1(a) of the CBA states that the Commissioner 
may fine or suspend a player “for conduct detrimental to the integ-
rity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional foot-
ball.”172 Article 46, Section 2(a) states that “the Commissioner may 
serve as hearing officer in any appeal under Section 1(a) of this Ar-
ticle at his discretion.”173 Article 46, Section 2(b) states that “[t]he 
NFLPA and NFL have the right to attend all hearings provided for 
in this Article and to present, by testimony or otherwise, any evi-
dence relevant to the hearing.”174 Article 46, Section 2(f)(ii) states 
that “[i]n appeals under Section 1(a), the parties shall exchange cop-
ies of any exhibits upon which they intend to rely on no later than 
three (3) calendar days prior to the hearing.”175 
                                                                                                             
 166 NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 32 (1987). 
 170 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(3) (2012). 
 171 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(2) (2012). 
 172 NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENT 204 (2011), https://nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/
01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf [hereinafter NFL CBA]. 
 173 Id. at 205. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
854 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:827 
 
C. The Standard NFL Player Contract 
In the Standard NFL Player Contract, which can be found in Ap-
pendix A of the CBA,176 players are provided notice of the follow-
ing: 
Player recognizes the detriment to the League and 
professional football that would result from impair-
ment of public confidence in the honest and orderly 
conduct of NFL games or the integrity and good 
character of NFL players. Player therefore acknowl-
edges his awareness that if he . . . is guilty of any . . . 
form of conduct reasonably judged by the League 
Commissioner to be detrimental to the League or 
professional football, the Commissioner will have 
the right, but only after giving Player the opportunity 
for a hearing at which he may be represented by 
counsel of his choice, to fine Player in a reasonable 
amount; to suspend Player for a period certain or in-
definitely; and/or to terminate this contract.177 
D. Notice 
Similar to the three judicial opinions discussed above,178 the be-
low analysis related to notice will be structured as follows: (1) 
whether Brady had notice he could be suspended, rather than fined; 
(2) whether Brady had notice he could be suspended for four games 
under a comparison between deflating footballs and steroid use; (3) 
whether Brady was on notice he could be punished for the specific 
type of conduct he engaged in; and (4) whether Brady was on notice 
he could be disciplined for providing inducements and rewards. 
1. SUSPENSION OR FINE 
Both Brady and Judge Berman argued that the only notice pro-
vided to Brady was that he could be fined under the Player Policies 
in the amount of $5,512 “for player equipment violations designed 
                                                                                                             
 176 See generally id. app. at 256–64. 
 177 Id. app. at 261–62. 
 178 See supra Parts II and III. 
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to gain a competitive advantage.”179 But this argument fails for the 
reasons presented by Judge Parker, among others. 
Judge Parker noted that the 2014 Schedule of Fines (incorpo-
rated into the Player Policies) provides that “other forms of disci-
pline, including higher fines and suspension may also be imposed, 
based on the circumstances of the particular violation.”180 Thus, 
even if it were true that Goodell based Brady’s discipline on the 
Player Policies and the 2014 Schedule of Fines, Judge Parker was 
correct in finding that Goodell arguably construed the terms above, 
as a suspension is permissible under the 2014 Schedule of Fines. 
Thus, Brady was on notice that his actions could result in suspen-
sion.181 
However, that method of reasoning is unnecessary. Pursuant to 
Article 46 of the CBA, Goodell is granted the authority to suspend 
any player “for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public con-
fidence in, the game of professional football.”182 Further, pursuant 
to the Standard NFL Player Contract, which Brady signed, the Com-
missioner is permitted to suspend a player if the Commissioner “rea-
sonably judge[s]” that the player’s conduct was “detrimental to the 
League or professional football.”183 Because Brady signed the 
Standard NFL Player Contract, he was provided with notice of the 
language within it. In other words, here, Brady was provided with 
clear notice of the possibility of being suspended for conduct detri-
mental to the League when he signed his NFL Player Contract. 
2. ANALOGIZING DEFLATING FOOTBALLS TO STEROID USE 
Judge Berman found that Brady had no notice that his suspen-
sion would be based on a comparison between deflating footballs 
and steroid use.184 Judge Berman reasoned that “as a matter of law, 
[the NFL’s Steroid Policy cannot] serve as adequate notice of disci-
pline to Brady,”185 and, as a result, “Goodell may be said to have 
                                                                                                             
 179 NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 180 NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527, 539 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 181 See id. at 538–39. 
 182 NFL CBA, supra note 172, at 204. 
 183 Id. app. at 261. For further discussion on the possible alarming effects of 
this Standard NFL Player Contract provision, see infra Part V. 
 184 NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 463–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 185 Id. at 464. 
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‘dispensed his own brand of industrial justice.’”186 In contrast, Judge 
Parker found that “[w]hile [Brady] may have been entitled to notice 
of his range of punishment, it does not follow that he was entitled to 
advance notice of the analogies the arbitrator might find persuasive 
in selecting a punishment within that range.”187 While both argu-
ments have merit, based on controlling principles of arbitration and 
labor law, Judge Parker’s position prevails. 
Article 46, which grants Goodell the authority to discipline play-
ers188 and provides the procedural details for disciplinary proceed-
ings,189 provides in relevant part that “[a]s soon as practicable fol-
lowing the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer will render 
a written decision which will constitute full, final and complete dis-
position of the dispute and will be binding upon the player(s), 
Club(s) and the parties to this Agreement with respect to that dis-
pute.”190 Nothing in the CBA, and more specifically, nothing in Ar-
ticle 46 or the Standard NFL Player Contract that Brady signed, 
mandates that Goodell explain his reasoning, or provide any analogy 
used, in determining the discipline imposed.191 Although comparing 
deflating footballs to using steroids may be a stretch of an analogy, 
Goodell arguably construed the CBA provision above. 
Dissenting Chief Judge Katzmann’s position was that the more 
appropriate comparison would have been between deflating foot-
balls and using stickum, given that use of stickum and deflation of 
footballs both “involve attempts at improving one’s grip and evad-
ing the referees’ enforcement of the rules.”192 However, courts are 
precluded “from resolving merits of parties’ labor disputes on basis 
of its own factual determinations, no matter how erroneous the arbi-
trator’s decision”193—and this is precisely what Judge Katzmann 
was attempting to do. In other words, Judge Katzmann argued 
Goodell’s analogy to steroid use was erroneous, and instead, 
Goodell should have compared deflating footballs to using stickum. 
                                                                                                             
 186 Id. at 466 (quoting 187 Concourse Assocs. v. Fishman, 399 F.3d 524, 527 
(2d Cir. 2005)). 
 187 NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527, 540 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 188 See NFL CBA, supra note 172, at 204–05. 
 189 See id. at 205. 
 190 Id. 
 191 See generally id. 
 192 NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 552 (Katzman, J., dissenting). 
 193 Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 511 (2001). 
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But, as the above principle mandates, Judge Katzmann is forbidden 
from resolving this dispute on his own factual determination, regard-
less of how erroneous he believed Goodell’s analogy was. 
Further, as Judge Parker stated, “[i]f deference means anything, 
it means that the arbitrator is entitled to generous latitude in phrasing 
his conclusions.”194 The larger issue under analysis was whether 
Goodell “arguably constru[ed]”195 the authority granted to him un-
der Article 46 of the CBA. Given that Article 46 does not require 
Goodell to explain the reasoning used to determine the award, 
Goodell was free to suspend Brady for four games, whether based 
on an analogy to steroid use, stickum, gambling, or otherwise, so 
long as Brady was on notice that he could be punished for his con-
duct. Thus, Goodell arguably construed the CBA, even though the 
analogy he applied may have been irrational. 
3. PUNISHMENT FOR SPECIFIC CONDUCT  
Judge Berman stated that “[n]o NFL policy or precedent pro-
vided notice that a player could be subject to discipline for general 
awareness of another person’s alleged misconduct.”196 Further, 
Judge Berman echoed Brady’s contention that “no player suspen-
sion in NFL history has been sustained for an alleged failure to co-
operate with—or even allegedly obstructing—an NFL investiga-
tion.”197 In other words, because no NFL player had ever been dis-
ciplined for being generally aware of others’ misconduct, and/or 
failing to cooperate with an investigation, Judge Berman found that 
Goodell violated the common law of the shop, and thus dispensed 
his own brand of industrial justice.198 Judge Parker, on the other 
hand, found that Brady was not suspended solely for being generally 
aware of others’ misconduct, or solely for non-cooperation with the 
Wells investigation, but rather, for being generally aware of others’ 
misconduct and for non-cooperation.199 
                                                                                                             
 194 NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 540. 
 195 See United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 30 
(1987). 
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While Judge Parker was correct that Goodell disciplined Brady 
for both of these findings together, rather than separately, it is also 
true that there is no NFL precedent providing notice to players that 
they can be disciplined for general awareness of others’ misconduct, 
non-cooperation with an investigation, or both the former and the 
latter. The counterview is that there is, in fact, NFL precedent that 
provides notice to players that they can be disciplined for the (very 
broadly defined) conduct detrimental standard found in Article 46 
and/or the Standard NFL Player Contract.200 
These conflicting views on disciplinary precedent beg the ques-
tion: under the counterview above––that is, that there is precedent 
that players have been disciplined for “conduct detrimental”––how 
broadly is this conduct detrimental standard to be defined? Could 
Goodell suspend a player for four games for partying the night be-
fore a big game, arguing that it qualifies as conduct detrimental to 
the public confidence in the game of professional football? The an-
swer to such a question is likely a resounding yes, yet critics and 
fans may argue that such discipline seems too strict.201 Further, fol-
lowing Judge Berman’s position detailed above, it could be argued 
that there is a lack of notice to the player that his conduct could fall 
under the all-encompassing conduct detrimental standard, which, as 
can be seen, may be applied so broadly as to inculpate any player 
for previously undisciplined actions. 
This analysis is based on two conflicting views of a complicated 
legal standard: the law of the shop and its definition and application. 
On the one hand, Judge Parker argues broadly that disciplining a 
player for engaging in conduct detrimental does not violate the law 
of the shop because players have been disciplined under this author-
ity in the past. On the other hand, Judge Berman argues that punish-
ing a player for engaging in conduct detrimental violates the law of 
the shop if the specific conduct for which the player is being disci-
plined (e.g., deflating footballs) has never been the subject of disci-
pline. Applying controlling arbitration principles, it logically fol-
lows that Goodell arguably construed the CBA, and thus complied 
with the law of the shop, in that a player, like Brady, is provided 
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notice of possible suspension under the conduct detrimental stand-
ard in Article 46 and/or the Standard NFL Player Contract. But, at 
the same time, such a broad standard creates a slippery slope for 
members of a union, or for those subject to a CBA, whereby the 
disciplinarian, like Goodell, can justify his or her discipline simply 
by reliance on an undefined standard, like conduct detrimental, 
which provides limited precedent to players for specific conduct 
they can and cannot engage in. 
While both Judge Berman’s and Judge Parker’s views hold 
merit, the issue of the undefined and arbitrary conduct detrimental 
standard seems difficult to resolve. Although Brady conceded that 
his conduct did, in fact, qualify as conduct detrimental, and confined 
his arguments to specific notice and procedural issues (essentially 
rendering this question discussed above untouched and without 
analysis), Judge Berman and the Second Circuit could have, and 
possibly should have, addressed the fairness of the conduct detri-
mental standard sua sponte, notwithstanding the fact that such a 
standard was collectively bargained. As it currently stands, the 
meaning of “conduct detrimental” is essentially left open to (only 
Roger Goodell’s) interpretation––this uncertainty warranted en 
banc review. 
4. DISCIPLINE FOR PROVIDING INDUCEMENTS AND REWARDS 
Dissenting Chief Judge Katzmann found that Brady was not on 
notice that he could be disciplined for providing “inducements and 
rewards in support of the scheme.”202 Further, Judge Katzmann 
stated that the Wells Report did not amount to a preponderance of 
the evidence203 that Brady’s gifts were “intended as rewards or ad-
vance payment for deflating footballs in violation of [NFL] 
rules.”204 
                                                                                                             
 202 NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527, 550 (2d Cir. 2016) (Katzman, J., 
dissenting). 
 203 See 1 NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, Policy on Integrity of the Game & En-
forcement of Competitive Rules, in ADMINISTRATIVE/BUSINESS OPERATIONS – 
LEAGUE RULES & POLICIES, https://www.espn.com/pdf/2015/0902/espn_otl_
nflintegritypolicy.pdf C7, C8 (providing that the “standard of proof required to 
find that a violation of the competitive rules has occurred shall be a Preponderance 
of the Evidence. . . . It means that, as a whole, the fact sought to be proved is more 
probable than not.”). 
 204 NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d at 550 (Katzman, J., dissenting). 
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In response, Judge Parker stated that the Wells Report made 
clear that its conclusion was “significantly influenced by the sub-
stantial number of communications and events consistent with its 
findings, including that McNally . . . received valuable items auto-
graphed by Tom Brady.”205 Further, Judge Parker explained that it 
was noted in the Wells Report that “Brady [was] a constant refer-
ence point in the discussions between McNally and Jastremski 
about . . . items to be received by McNally.”206 Judge Parker thereby 
found that Brady was provided notice that these gifts were at issue 
once the Wells Report was published.207 
The issue restated is whether Brady was on notice that his rela-
tionship and communications with McNally and Jastremski would 
be at issue in the arbitration, even though the Wells Report never 
conclusively found that the three participated in a quid pro quo for 
deflating footballs. The Wells Report only stated that Brady’s rela-
tionship and communications with Jastremski and McNally “signif-
icantly influenced” the conclusions.208 Judge Parker holds to the be-
lief that knowledge of this significant influence was enough to put 
Brady on notice that his relationship and communications with Ja-
stremski and McNally would be at issue.209 Yet, Judge Katzmann 
would require a finding consistent with the requisite standard of 
proof that Brady “more probabl[y] than not” participated in a quid 
pro quo with Jastremski and McNally for their efforts in deflating 
footballs.210 
In an attempt to determine which view prevails, an analogy—for 
lack of a less ironic method of reasoning211—may offer insight. If 
the law of the shop provides that a player is on notice that his con-
duct may lead to discipline because he was aware that there had 
been discipline for similar conduct in the past,212 then it similarly 
                                                                                                             
 205 Id. at 542 (majority opinion). 
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follows that a player is on notice that a factor may influence the ar-
bitrator’s decision because he was aware that it was an influential 
factor in the past. In other words, because Brady was aware of the 
“significant influence” that his relationship and communications 
with Jastremski and McNally played in the Wells Report conclu-
sion,213 he was therefore on notice that his relationship and commu-
nications with Jastremski and McNally could play a role in 
Goodell’s final decision. 
E. Examining Jeff Pash 
Goodell denied Brady’s motion to compel NFL Executive Vice 
President Jeff Pash’s testimony at the arbitration hearing on the 
grounds that Pash did not “play a substantive role in the investiga-
tion,” and that the Wells Report was “prepared entirely by the Paul 
Weiss investigative team.”214 Given Mr. Wells’ testimony at the ar-
bitration that Pash assisted in the editing process of the Wells Re-
port,215 Judge Berman concluded that Pash’s testimony was, in fact, 
necessary because Pash would have had “valuable insight into the 
course and outcome of the investigation and into the drafting and 
content of the Wells Report,” and could testify as to whether the 
investigation was independent.216 In other words, Judge Berman ar-
gued that “Pash was in the best position to testify about the NFL’s 
degree of involvement in, and potential shaping of, a heralded ‘in-
dependent’ [i]nvestigation.”217 
Judge Parker took the position that Pash’s testimony about the 
independence of the investigation and subsequent Wells Report 
would have been separate from the main issue, which was whether 
Brady had engaged in conduct detrimental to the NFL.218 Judge Par-
ker found that “[t]he CBA does not require an independent investi-
gation, and nothing would have prohibited [Goodell] from using an 
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in-house team to conduct the investigation.”219 Judge Parker also 
added that Goodell “made clear that the independence of the Wells 
Report” was immaterial to the discipline.220 
Judge Parker’s position prevails under controlling arbitration 
principles and CBA provisions. The Federal Arbitration Act re-
quires that when “arbitrators [are] guilty of . . . refusing to hear evi-
dence pertinent and material to the controversy,” then vacatur may 
be necessary.221 In addition, vacatur is warranted only when funda-
mental fairness is violated.222 Generally, arbitrators “are endowed 
with ‘discretion to admit or reject evidence and determine what ma-
terials may be cumulative or irrelevant.’”223 
Article 46, Section 2(b) provides that “[t]he NFLPA and NFL 
have the right to attend all hearings provided for in this Article and 
to present, by testimony or otherwise, any evidence relevant to the 
hearing.”224 Article 46, Section 2(f)(ii) provides that “[i]n appeals 
under Section 1(a), the parties shall exchange copies of any exhibits 
upon which they intend to rely no later than three (3) calendar days 
prior to the hearing.”225 
The text of Article 46 is straightforward—the CBA does not re-
quire that all evidence must be admitted; the CBA simply requires 
that the relevant admitted evidence be exchanged no later than three 
days before the hearing.226 Applied to the arbitration, Goodell’s 
judgment that Pash did not play a substantive role in the investiga-
tion is in accordance with these CBA provisions. Goodell was 
within his authorized discretion as arbitrator “to admit or reject evi-
dence and determine what materials may be cumulative or irrele-
vant”227 when he decided that Pash’s testimony about the independ-
ence of the investigation (which Judge Parker accurately painted as 
outside the main issue) was unnecessary. Although Judge Berman 
and Brady may have believed that denying Pash’s testimony was 
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generally unfair, the CBA, which was negotiated and collectively 
bargained, did not require Goodell to compel Pash’s testimony, so 
long as Goodell believed––as he did––such testimony was not ma-
terial or pertinent to the controversy. For these reasons, Judge Par-
ker’s argument prevails on this issue. 
F. The Wells Report Investigative Notes 
Goodell denied Brady’s motion requesting access to the Wells 
Report investigative notes, claiming they “played no role in the dis-
ciplinary decisions; the Wells Report was the basis for those deci-
sions.”228 Judge Berman, focusing on Paul, Weiss’s role as both 
NFL investigators and NFL counsel, stated that “this change in roles 
may have afforded Goodell (and Pash) greater access to valuable 
impressions, insights, and other investigation information which 
was not available to Brady.”229 Judge Parker found that Goodell rea-
sonably interpreted the CBA to not require such expansive discov-
ery.230 Judge Parker also noted that Goodell “did not review any of 
Paul, Weiss’ internal interview notes or any other documents gener-
ated by Paul, Weiss other than the final report.”231 
Goodell was within his authorized discretion as arbitrator to “ad-
mit or reject evidence” that he may consider irrelevant to the issue 
presented.232 Article 46 of the CBA provides in relevant part that 
“[i]n appeals under Section 1(a), the parties shall exchange copies 
of any exhibits upon which they intend to rely.”233 It should be noted 
that Judge Berman stated that the change in roles of the Paul, Weiss 
team “may have” afforded Goodell and Pash more access to these 
investigative notes, and that Brady was restricted from materials that 
“may have” led to his suspension.234 But “may have” does not 
equate to “which they intend to rely,” which would trigger an ex-
change of exhibits. With these considerations in mind, Goodell con-
                                                                                                             
 228 Decision on Hearing Witnesses, supra note 214, at SPA65. 
 229 NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 230 NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527, 547 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 231 Id. at 546–47. 
 232 Abu Dhabi Inv. Auth., 2013 WL 789642, at *8. 
 233 NFL CBA, supra note 172, at 205 (emphasis added). 
 234 See NFL Mgmt. Council I, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 472–73. 
864 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:827 
 
strued Article 46 to mean that Brady’s possession of the Wells Re-
port investigative notes was unnecessary because Paul, Weiss—act-
ing as counsel to the NFL—did not intend to rely on them. 
Further, the issue presented in the arbitration hearing was 
whether Goodell’s initial discipline was justified. Goodell empha-
sized the fact that he never considered the investigative notes when 
determining whether, and for how long, he would discipline 
Brady—rather, he stated that he focused solely on the Wells Report. 
Although Judge Berman expressed concern with the seemingly con-
flicting roles played by Paul, Weiss (i.e., both as investigator for and 
counsel to the NFL), nothing in the CBA mandates that the investi-
gation be conducted by an independent team, or a team independent 
to those representing an adverse party. Judge Parker correctly con-
cluded that Goodell was, at the very least, arguably construing the 
CBA, and thus, did not violate the necessity of fundamental fairness. 
Though the CBA does not forbid an investigative party subse-
quently acting as counsel, the apparent conflict raises questions. The 
CBA offers no means for someone like Brady who is attempting to 
gain access to evidence that only the disciplinarian had access to. 
Should Brady have trusted that Goodell was honest in his assertion 
that the discipline was based solely on the Wells Report? Imagine if 
the roles were reversed, and Brady had hired Paul, Weiss to repre-
sent him during the arbitration. It is “more probable than not” that 
Goodell would feel discomfort knowing that Brady hired the team 
who conducted the investigation to represent him. There is an ele-
ment of unfairness in this dynamic, though not necessarily under 
controlling legal principles. 
G.  Brady’s Request for En Banc Review 
Based on the above discussion, there is a colorable argument that 
the Second Circuit should have granted en banc review. Brady and 
Judge Berman focused primarily on issues related to notice, fairness, 
and the law of the shop,235 while Judge Parker focused primarily on 
whether Goodell acted within his broad authority as arbitrator and 
under the CBA.236 While it is argued above that the majority of 
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Judge Parker’s arguments would have prevailed should en banc re-
view have been granted, it is unclear whether Brady was on notice 
that his specific conduct could have led to a four-game suspen-
sion.237 Further, none of the three writing judges discussed the 
vagueness and arbitrary application of the CBA’s conduct detri-
mental standard found in Article 46 and the Standard NFL Player 
Contract. 
H. Commentary to the Second Circuit’s Majority Opinion 
Former Solicitor General, Ted Olson, who joined Brady’s legal 
team just prior to Brady’s request for en banc review, emphasized 
the impact of the Second Circuit’s decision, writing that this matter 
“raises significant labor law issues that could have far-reaching con-
sequences for all employees subject to [CBAs].”238 Olson pointed 
out that the legal issues in “the [Second Circuit’s] opinion are of 
great importance not only to NFL players, but to all unionized em-
ployees.”239 
Olson is correct—all unionized employees and employees sub-
ject to CBAs could be affected by the Second Circuit’s holding. In 
fact, the following outlined scenario provides an example of how 
broadly and unfairly the Second Circuit’s holding could be applied: 
(1) an employee can be investigated by his or her boss for engaging 
in conduct never before disciplined; (2) the employee can be disci-
plined by that boss, despite this type of conduct never being the sub-
ject of discipline before; (3) given no previous similar discipline, the 
boss can assign whatever discipline he or she wishes; (4) the severity 
of discipline can be based on a ludicrous comparison to an irrelevant 
disciplinary policy; (5) the employee’s appeal will be heard by none 
other than the same boss who initially disciplined the employee; (6) 
the boss can make a final decision confirming the initial discipline 
based on new facts revealed only at the appeal; (7) the employee can 
elect to appeal to a federal district court, but face the burden of the 
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extraordinary cost of litigation; and (8) the reviewing court(s) can 
confirm the boss’ discipline and arbitration award, pointing to the 
deference afforded to arbitration awards and to the CBA to which 
the employee had no individual input. 
Put another way: We were all in grade school once. Imagine 
your teacher sends you to detention. Now, imagine that you have the 
right to challenge that discipline. Unfortunately for you, your chal-
lenge must be made to that same teacher. Good luck. 
V. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE NFL COMMISSIONER’S AUTHORITY 
Deflategate is just one of many similar scandals in which 
Goodell’s broad authority was at issue or applied.240 But does the 
NFL Commissioner have too much authority? This Part will offer 
insight into the extent of the NFL Commissioner’s authority. There-
after, this Part will offer points for consideration for the negotiations 
and collective bargaining that will occur following the current 
CBA’s expiration after the 2020–2021 NFL season. 
A. The Power of Article 46 
Article 46, Section 1(a) of the CBA states that the Commissioner 
may fine or suspend a player “for conduct detrimental to the integ-
rity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional foot-
ball.”241 Article 46, Section 2(a) states that “the Commissioner may 
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serve as hearing officer in any appeal under Section 1(a) of this Ar-
ticle at his discretion.”242 
Pursuant to the Standard NFL Player Contract, which can be 
found in Appendix A of the CBA,243 the Commissioner holds the 
following authority: 
Player therefore acknowledges his awareness that if 
he . . . is guilty of any . . . form of conduct reasonably 
judged by the League Commissioner to be detri-
mental to the League or professional football, the 
Commissioner will have the right . . . to fine Player 
in a reasonable amount; to suspend Player for a pe-
riod certain or indefinitely; and/or to terminate this 
contract.244 
These provisions prompt questions and concerns. First, under 
Article 46, Section 1(a), how broadly is “conduct detrimental” to be 
stretched? Looking to Deflategate, it was stretched almost to the 
point of snapping––the insignificant finding that Brady was “at least 
generally aware” of others’ misconduct constituted (notably, for the 
first time in NFL history) sufficient detrimental conduct worthy of 
a four-game suspension. But under what analytical test is such det-
rimental conduct to be judged? Is it fair that only one person––the 
Commissioner––determines the ultimate discipline? Is conduct det-
rimental as a disciplinary standard inherently fair because a defer-
ential court suggests it is,245 or because other major league sports 
organizations have similar standards and provisions in their respec-
tive collective bargaining agreements?246 As mentioned above, un-
                                                                                                             
 242 Id. at 205. 
 243 See id. app. at 256–64. 
 244 Id. app. at 261–62 (emphasis added). 
 245 See generally NFL Mgmt. Council II, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 246 See generally MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT 2017–2021 (2017), http://www.mlbplayers.com/pdf9/5450407.pdf 
[hereinafter MLB CBA]; NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING AGREEMENT (2017), http://3c90sm37lsaecdwtr32v9qof-wpen-
gine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2017-NBA-NBPA-Collective-
Bargaining-Agreement.pdf [hereinafter NBA CBA]; COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND NATIONAL HOCKEY 
LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION SEPTEMBER 16, 2012 – SEPTEMBER 15, 2022 
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fortunately, neither the district court nor the Second Circuit in De-
flategate discussed these concerns about the conduct detrimental 
standard.247 
Second, and most troubling, is the inconsistent and unreasonably 
broad authority that is granted to the NFL Commissioner in the 
Standard NFL Player Contract. According to its text, if the Commis-
sioner were to “reasonably judge[]” that a player has engaged in 
conduct detrimental to the NFL, then the Commissioner has the con-
tractual right to suspend the player indefinitely or terminate his con-
tract.248 It is important to note the differences between the language 
in Article 46, Section 1(a), and the language in the Standard NFL 
Player Contract. In the former, the Commissioner is permitted to 
discipline a player “for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or 
public confidence in, the game of professional football.”249 Whereas 
in the latter, the Commissioner is permitted to discipline a player 
(e.g., he can terminate his contract, which is not permitted in Article 
46, Section 1(a)) for conduct that he or she reasonably judges to be 
detrimental to the League.250 In the former, “reasonably judges,” 
which is a low threshold and an entirely discretionary standard, is 
absent. In the latter, “to the League” is much broader, allowing for 
more flexibility in application when compared to the former’s “to 
the integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional 
football.” These differences beg the question: what conduct could 
be reasonably judged as detrimental to the NFL? Could Roger 
Goodell terminate the contract of a player invoking his First Amend-
ment right? 
Throughout the 2016–2017 NFL season, former San Francisco 
49ers quarterback Colin Kaepernick knelt during the national an-
them in protest against police brutality of minorities.251 Many fellow 
                                                                                                             
(2012), http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/CBA2012/NHL_NHLPA_2013_
CBA.pdf [hereinafter NHL CBA]. 
 247 See infra Parts II & III. 
 248 See NFL CBA, supra note 172, app. at 261–62. 
 249 Id. at 204 (emphasis added). 
 250 See id. app. at 261–62. 
 251 See Steve Wyche, Colin Kaepernick Explains Why He Sat During National 
Anthem, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000
691077/article/colin-kaepernick-explains-protest-of-national-anthem (last up-
dated Aug. 28, 2016, 4:33 PM). In an interview with NFL Media Reporter Steve 
Wyche, Kaepernick stated, “I’m not going to stand up to show pride in a flag for 
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NFL players followed Kaepernick and began kneeling in protest, as 
well.252 In his usual controversial fashion, on September 22, 2017, 
during a rally for Alabama Senate Republican candidate Luther 
Strange, then-presidential candidate Donald Trump stated the fol-
lowing in response to the NFL player protests: 
Wouldn’t you love to see one of these NFL owners, 
when somebody disrespects our flag, to say “Get that 
son of a b[****] off the field right now. Out! He’s 
fired. He’s fired!” . . . [Y]ou know what’s hurting the 
game . . . ? When people like yourselves turn on tel-
evision and you see those people taking the knee 
when they’re playing our great national anthem. The 
only thing you could do better is if you see it, even if 
it’s one player, leave the stadium. I guarantee things 
will stop.253 
Two days later, on September 24, 2017, in a display of solidarity 
following Trump’s controversial comments, dozens of NFL players, 
along with some team owners, knelt in protest.254 Several players 
who did not kneel, instead stood and locked arms with teammates in 
solidarity.255 And, every player from the Seattle Seahawks and Ten-
nessee Titans remained in their locker rooms during the national an-
them.256 
                                                                                                             
a country that oppresses black people and people of color . . . There are bodies in 
the street and people getting paid leave and getting away with murder.” Id. 
 252 For a list of NFL players who have knelt in solidarity with Colin Kaeper-
nick, see Arian Foster, Marcus Peters Among NFL Players Protesting During 
National Anthem, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.si.com/
nfl/2016/09/11/national-anthem-protest-kneel-sit-players-list. 
 253 Sophie Tatum, Trump: NFL Owners Should Fire Players Who Protest the 
National Anthem, CNN: POLITICS, http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/22/politics/don-
ald-trump-alabama-nfl/index.html (last updated Sept. 23, 2017, 4:05 PM); accord 
Bryan Armen Graham, Donald Trump Blasts NFL Anthem Protestors: ‘Get that 
Son of a B[****] Off the Field’, GUARDIAN (Sept. 23, 2017, 6:43 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/sep/22/donald-trump-nfl-national-an-
them-protests. 
 254 Benjamin Hoffman et al., After Trump Blasts N.F.L., Players Kneel and 
Lock Arms in Solidarity, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/09/24/sports/nfl-trump-anthem-protests.html. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
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Are President Trump’s comments without merit? Could a player 
actually be fired for kneeling in protest? Pursuant to the language of 
the Standard NFL Player Contract discussed above, it is reasonable 
to conclude that the Commissioner would indeed be permitted to 
terminate the contract of any player kneeling in protest, so long as 
the Commissioner could “reasonably judge[ ]” that such protest is 
detrimental to the NFL.257 But what conduct could be detrimental? 
The NFL is a business dependent upon public image. Thus, any con-
duct that could compromise the NFL’s public image could be rea-
sonably judged as detrimental to the NFL. Recent television ratings 
reports show that NFL ratings are in decline, in part due to these 
player protests.258 Even more, in response to the player protests, 
many fans have boycotted the NFL––either because they are of-
fended by the protests,259 or because they dislike that Kaepernick 
                                                                                                             
 257 See NFL CBA, supra note 172, app. at 261–62. It is important to note that 
President Trump’s comments were in the context of NFL team owners––not the 
NFL Commissioner––firing protesting players. This distinction is rather im-
portant, given the different authority that team owners and the Commissioner pos-
sess under the CBA. See generally id. This Note is focused solely on the Com-
missioner’s authority. However, for an in-depth discussion on the legality of an 
NFL team owner firing a protesting player, see Michael McCann, Can an NFL 
Owner Legally ‘Fire’ a Player for Protesting?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 23, 
2017), https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/09/23/donald-trump-fired-roger-goodell-
player-protest; see also Tatiana Waserstein, O Say Can You . . . Kneel? The Le-
gality Behind Firing NFL Players for Taking a Knee During the National Anthem, 
U. MIAMI L. REV.: INSIGHTS (Oct. 12, 2017), https://lawreview.law.miami.edu/
kneel-legality-firing-nfl-players-knee-national-anthem/. 
 258 See Albert Breer, Declining NFL Television Ratings Presented at Meeting 
Grabbed Attention of Owners, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 19, 2017), 
https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/10/19/nfl-ratings-decline-owners-players-meeting-
mmqb (“[N]o one is claiming that . . . players kneeling during the anthem [is] 
even close to the only reason[ ] for the professional football model being shaken 
up a bit. But the fact is, the model has been shaken up a bit.”). 
 259 See Matthew VanTryon, Here’s Why More than 20,000 Say They Will Boy-
cott NFL Games for Veterans Day, INDYSTAR, https://www.indystar.com/
story/sports/nfl/2017/11/10/heres-why-more-than-20-000-boycott-nfl-games-
veterans-da/849326001/ (last updated Nov. 10, 2017, 1:27 PM); Gary Nelson, 
Off-Duty Officers Taking Stand Against Kneeling NFL Players, CBS MIAMI (Oct. 
20, 2017, 6:51 PM), http://miami.cbslocal.com/2017/10/20/miami-dade-police-
protest-national-anthem-kneeling/ (explaining that Miami-Dade police “officers 
are refusing to volunteer to work Hard Rock Stadium Sunday when the [Miami 
Dolphins] host the [New York] Jets.”). 
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has been “blackballed” by the NFL.260 Notably, on October 8, 2017, 
during a game between the Indianapolis Colts and the San Francisco 
49ers, Vice President Mike Pence controversially left the game in 
response to a number of players kneeling during the national an-
them.261 
In other words, President Trump’s statements, Vice President 
Pence’s reactionary protest, boycotts, and declining television rat-
ings would not have occurred but for the players kneeling in protest 
during the national anthem. And, the player protests, no matter how 
constitutional, peaceful, and well-intentioned as they may be, could 
be reasonably judged as detrimental to the NFL, giving the Com-
missioner grounds for terminating their contracts pursuant to the 
Standard NFL Player Contract. But, although permissible, would 
such a termination be right? Should Goodell be given such broad 
disciplinary authority? 
B. Looking to the 2021 CBA 
As highlighted above, the NFL Commissioner’s authority is far 
too broad in three ways. First, the Commissioner is permitted to dis-
cipline a player “for conduct detrimental to the integrity of, or public 
confidence in, the game of professional football,” which is an unde-
fined and arbitrary standard, subject only to the Commissioner’s in-
terpretation.262 Second, the Commissioner is permitted to elect him 
                                                                                                             
 260 Kevin B. Blackistone, The NFL Has Effectively Blackballed Colin Kaeper-
nick, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/red-
skins/the-nfl-has-effectively-blackballed-colin-kaepernick/2017/03/23/d0b754d
6-0fd1-11e7-ab07-07d9f521f6b5_story.html?utm_term=.bd5048f197aa; Scott 
Gleeson, Steve Kerr: ‘No-brainer’ that Colin Kaepernick is Being ‘blackballed’ 
in NFL, USA TODAY: SPORTS (Oct. 31, 2017, 10:20 AM), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/sports/nba/warriors/2017/10/31/steve-kerr-colin-kaepernick-
white-house-nfl-nba/816441001/. In response to being blackballed by the NFL, 
Colin Kaepernick has filed a grievance against the NFL for collusion. For more 
information and an in-depth analysis on Kaepernick’s grievance against the NFL, 
see Michael McCann, Kaepernick Collusion Case: What Does It Mean that Jones, 
Kraft, Other Owners Will Be Deposed?, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 3, 2017), 
https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/11/03/colin-kaepernick-collusion-jerry-jones-bob-
mcnair-robert-kraft-owners-be-deposed. 
 261 Eli Watkins, Pence Leaves Colts Game After Protest During Anthem, 
CNN: POLITICS (Oct. 9, 2017, 11:28 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/08/poli-
tics/vice-president-mike-pence-nfl-protest/index.html. 
 262 See NFL CBA, supra note 172, at 204. 
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or herself as the arbitrator in any challenge of an initial discipline.263 
Third, the Commissioner is permitted to discipline any player for 
conduct that the Commissioner reasonably judges as detrimental to 
the NFL.264 There is no question that the NFLPA collectively bar-
gained poorly with respect to Commissioner authority in the 2011 
CBA.265 However, the current CBA expires following the 2020–
2021 NFL season,266 lending the NFLPA an opportunity to remedy 
its prior efforts. And the NFLPA has already expressed its commit-
ment to revise the structures and provisions present in the 2011 
CBA.267 
It is important to first note the relevant similarities and differ-
ences between the NFL’s CBA and the CBAs of Major League 
Baseball (“MLB”) and the National Basketball Association 
(“NBA”). The MLB CBA provides that the MLB Commissioner is 
permitted to discipline players for conduct that questions “the integ-
rity of, or the maintenance of public confidence in, the game of base-
ball.”268 Further, pursuant to Article XI(A)(1)(b) of the MLB CBA, 
Commissioner disciplinary action can only be appealed directly to 
the Commissioner.269 As for the NBA CBA, the NBA Commis-
                                                                                                             
 263 See id. at 205. 
 264 See id. app. at 261–62. 
 265 See Ben Volin, Now More than Ever, We Realize NFL Owners Won, 
BOSTON GLOBE (July 21, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2013/07/
20/nfl-owners-destroyed-players-cba-negotiations/ia3c1ydpS16H5FhFEiviHP/
story.html. 
 266 See Chris Chavez, NFL Players Union President Eric Winston: NFL Lock-
out ‘Inevitable’ for 2021, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 22, 2017), 
https://www.si.com/nfl/2017/08/22/nfl-lockout-inevitable-eric-winston-players-
union (noting the likelihood that a lockout will occur “when the 10-year collective 
bargaining agreement expires in 2021.”). 
 267 See Mark Maske, NFLPA: ‘There’s Not Gonna Be an Extension of the 
CBA’ Without Changes, WASH. POST: SPORTS (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2017/01/25/nflpa-theres-not-gonna-be-an-exten-
sion-of-the-cba-without-changes/?utm_term=.6b5af2dd1739 (noting that a CBA 
extension is unlikely to happen without significant changes related, in part, to the 
arbitration and Commissioner authority provisions). 
 268 MLB CBA, supra note 246, at 42; accord PETER A. CARFAGNA, SPORTS 
AND THE LAW: EXAMINING THE LEGAL EVOLUTION OF AMERICA’S THREE 
“MAJOR LEAGUES” 5 (3d ed. 2017). 
 269 MLB CBA, supra note 246, at 42. 
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sioner may discipline players for conduct that questions “the integ-
rity of, or the public confidence in, the game of basketball.”270 How-
ever, the NBA CBA differs from the NBA and NFL CBAs regarding 
Commissioner authority with respect to who may act as the hearing 
officer of an appeal: 
If a player’s punishment for off-court conduct results 
in a financial impact of $50,000 or less, Commis-
sioner discipline is only reviewable by the Commis-
sioner. If, however, punishment results in financial 
impact of more than $50,000, a player may file a 
grievance and have it heard by an impartial arbitra-
tor.271 
Therefore, the NFL, MLB, and NBA CBAs are all similar in terms 
of Commissioner’s authority regarding player conduct and appeal 
procedures, notwithstanding the NBA’s $50,000 threshold for im-
partial arbitrator or Commissioner review. 
But are there more reasonable alternatives to these provisions? 
With respect to disciplinary appeals, as governed by Article 46, Sec-
tion 2(a) of the NFL CBA,272 attorney Adriano Pacifici recom-
mended a reasonable alternative that may provide more fairness to 
players.273 His recommendation was simple––the NFL should 
“adopt a hybrid system of commissioner disciplinary review,” lim-
iting the Commissioner’s authority solely to determining initial dis-
cipline.274 Under Mr. Pacifici’s hybrid system, rather than the Com-
missioner having the contractual discretion to elect him or herself as 
the arbitrator for an appeal to his or her discipline, three neutral and 
independent arbitrators would hear and decide all appeals.275 The 
three arbitrators would be selected from a list of nine potential arbi-
trators from the American Arbitration Association, wherein the 
                                                                                                             
 270 NBA CBA, supra note 246, at 401, 404–05; accord CARFAGNA, supra note 
268, at 8. 
 271 CARFAGNA, supra note 268, at 8; accord NBA CBA, supra note 246, at 
404–05. 
 272 NFL CBA, supra note 172, at 204–05. 
 273 See Adriano Pacifici, Scope and Authority of Sports League Commissioner 
Disciplinary Power: Bounty and Beyond, 3 BERKELEY J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 93, 
112–15 (2014). 
 274 Id. at 112. 
 275 Id. at 113–15. 
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NFLPA and the NFL would each “have the ability to eliminate three 
potential arbitrators, leaving them with a three-person panel.”276 Mr. 
Pacifici’s hybrid system is consistent with the current system man-
dated by the National Hockey League (“NHL”) CBA, which pro-
vides for impartial and independent arbitrators to review the NHL 
Commissioner’s disciplinary decisions.277 Should the NFL commit 
to such a hybrid system, the NBA and MLB may follow suit, thereby 
providing for fairness to all major league sports players and, ideally, 
consistency across professional sports. 
As for Article 46, Section 1(a), which states that the Commis-
sioner may fine or suspend a player “for conduct detrimental to the 
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional foot-
ball,”278 a reasonable alternative may not be so obvious. After all, 
each of the other three major sports leagues––the NBA, MLB, and 
NHL––have similar provisions granting the Commissioner broad 
authority to discipline conduct that undermines the integrity of or 
public confidence in the respective sport and league. That being 
said, the Commissioner authority found in the Standard NFL Player 
Contract is too broad and needs revision––otherwise, as established 
above, the Commissioner could discipline, and even terminate the 
contract of, any player who engages in constitutionally-protected 
behavior, such as kneeling in protest in accordance with the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
During the collective bargaining and negotiation stages for the 
new CBA, the NFLPA should focus its efforts on revising Article 
46, Section 2(a) to accord with Mr. Pacifici’s hybrid system, and 
striking the provision in the Standard NFL Player Contract that 
grants the Commissioner authority to discipline––and even fire––a 
player for conduct reasonably judged by the Commissioner as detri-
mental to the NFL. Though, why would the NFL agree to any con-
tractual revisions in this respect? What leverage does, or could, the 
NFLPA have in bargaining for these contractual revisions? 
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First, as was recently argued by the former NFLPA President, 
Domonique Foxworth, the NFLPA can decertify as a union and, in-
stead, operate as a trade association.279 According to Foxworth, 
“[t]he existence of unions allows leagues to operate under rules that 
are in violation of federal antitrust law, which is why decertifying 
has been the most impactful threat to leagues.”280 Under an associa-
tion, the players 
would be working under rules imposed by the 
leagues, not agreed upon with the players––rules that 
are clear violations of federal antitrust law: franchise 
tag, salary caps and luxury tax, minimum salary lim-
its . . . drafts and age restrictions, the NFL’s infamous 
commissioner power in Article 46, etc. It would force 
the [NFL] back into a world they fear, a world where 
they have to follow the same laws as other businesses 
or be exposed to the risk of treble damages.281 
In other words, decertifying could grant the NFLPA leverage in ad-
vance of the upcoming collective bargaining. 
But decertifying presents a host of legal and practical difficul-
ties. Decertifying worked against the NFLPA during the 2011 NFL 
CBA negotiations.282 The NFL called the NFLPA’s move to decer-
tify a sham.283 And, in Brady v. Nat’l Football League, the Eighth 
Circuit agreed, finding that the NFLPA had decertified when nego-
tiations were at an impasse, and thus, the NFL was still entitled to 
operate under already existing antitrust exemptions.284 According to 
Foxworth, “decertifying now, well in advance of any negotiations, 
is a more than sufficient ‘distance in time’ to avoid” an accusation 
                                                                                                             
 279 Domonique Foxworth, All 22: Why Decertification of the NFLPA and 
Other Unions Could Pay Off Big, UNDEFEATED (July 25, 2017), https://theunde-
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from the NFL that decertifying is a sham to create leverage for CBA 
negotiations.285 
Decertifying could pay off dividends (assuming it is done genu-
inely and not as a sham). But given the obvious risks in such a 
move,286 an alternative means to limiting the Commissioner’s au-
thority is a renegotiation of total NFL revenue sharing. Under the 
2011 CBA, the NFLPA is entitled to 47% of all revenue from 2011 
through 2021.287 Should the scenario arise during upcoming negoti-
ations, the NFL should agree to additional player protections incor-
porated into the CBA––including a limitation of Commissioner au-
thority as outlined above––in exchange for the NFLPA’s reduced 
share of NFL revenue from 47% to 46% from 2021 to 2031. Neither 
the NFL nor the NFLPA have much to lose in such an agreement. 
Looking to the NFL’s total revenue for 2016, which was roughly 
$14 billion,288 the players’ 47% share under the 2011 CBA equated 
to roughly $6.58 billion. However, should the players only take 46% 
of the $14 billion revenue figure, the share equates to roughly $6.44 
billion, which is still quite a lot of money. From the NFL’s perspec-
tive, using the $14 billion revenue figure as a baseline, an additional 
annual 1% share of revenue from 2021 through 2031 would amount 
to $1.4 billion. But even this $1.4 billion figure may be significantly 
understated, given that Goodell has expressed that he wants total 
NFL annual revenues to reach $25 billion by 2027.289 From the 
NFLPA’s perspective, losing $140 million annually seems too 
costly at first. But, as noted above, 46% of the 2016 NFL total rev-
enue still equated to a substantial amount of money. And, again, 
with each year that the NFL continues to see an increase in its total 
revenue, the NFLPA’s financial losses will quickly be mitigated. 
                                                                                                             
 285 Foxworth, supra note 279. 
 286 For more information on further risks that come with decertifying, see id. 
 287 NFL Clubs Approve Comprehensive Agreement, NAT’L FOOTBALL 
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Nonetheless, despite the obvious benefit to both parties––i.e., the 
NFLPA contractually protects its players and the NFL makes more 
money––the necessary question in determining whether such an 
agreement could materialize is whether the NFL and NFLPA be-
lieve a difference in revenue sharing is worth the additional protec-
tions to the players. 
Should decertifying and revising NFL revenue sharing prove to 
be unsuccessful strategies, it is recommended here that the NFL, and 
more specifically, Commissioner Goodell, should remain flexible 
during collective bargaining in an attempt to repair the NFL’s public 
image. It goes without saying that Roger Goodell (and thus, the 
NFL), has a public perception problem—“[he] has a 28 percent job 
approval rating, with 42 percent disapproving and 30 percent un-
sure. It’s even worse when respondents were asked if they have a 
favorable or unfavorable opinion of [Goodell]—19 percent thumbs-
up, 40 percent thumbs-down, 40 percent not sure.”290 This level of 
disapproval may be because of the way Goodell has been perceived 
during and after his handling of NFL scandals, including the Boun-
tygate,291 Ray Rice,292 Adrian Peterson,293 Deflategate, and Ezekiel 
Elliott294 matters. 
Fans love the NFL and buy its products because of their admira-
tion for the players. But many players have grown to strongly dislike 
Goodell and have expressed such sentiments publicly.295 Players’ 
distaste for Goodell could be imputed to fans—and if fans dislike 
Goodell, then it naturally follows that the NFL’s abysmal approval 
rating296 may be in part due to the conflict between the players and 
Goodell. 
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SPORTS (Feb. 10, 2016, 5:13 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/roger-
goodell-s-approval-rating-is-lower-than-president-obama-s-021016. 
 291 See generally Terrell, supra note 72. 
 292 See generally Wilson, supra note 87. 
 293 See generally Orr, supra note 86. 
 294 See generally Thomas, supra 240. 
 295 E.g., Steven Ruiz, Roger Goodell Tells Booing NFL Draft Crowd to ‘Bring 
It On,’ USA TODAY: SPORTS: FOR THE WIN (Apr. 30, 2016, 1:00 PM), 
http://ftw.usatoday.com/2016/04/2016-nfl-draft-commisioner-roger-goodell-
boos-bring-it-on. 
 296 See Breer, supra note 258. 
878 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:827 
 
Examples of players’ disdain for Goodell are endless. In a 2010 
interview with NFL Network, former Chicago Bears linebacker 
Brian Urlacher stated the following about Goodell: “It’s a dictator-
ship. . . . If [Roger] Goodell wants to fine you he’s going to fine you, 
that’s the way it goes and that’s just the way it is.”297 Former Pitts-
burgh Steelers linebacker James Harrison has said that he “hate[s] 
[Goodell] and will never respect him.”298 Former Pittsburgh Steelers 
free safety Ryan Clark, once an NFLPA representative and now an 
ESPN NFL analyst,299 stated the following in an ESPN interview: 
When you’ve been in those meetings and you’ve 
been through labor negotiations, and you see how 
Roger Goodell and the owners feel about the players, 
the things that were said to the players during this 
time, you develop a hate—you really do, . . . [a]nd 
sometimes you can’t see through that hate. Some-
times it factors into all of your thoughts about the 
NFL, about the owners, about Roger Goodell.300 
Former New Orleans Saints linebacker Jonathan Vilma co-owns a 
restaurant in Miami that has a picture of Goodell with the caption 
“DO NOT SERVE THIS MAN.”301 In an interview with Sports Il-
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lustrated, New Orleans Saints quarterback Drew Bress said the fol-
lowing about Goodell and his Article 46 powers: “[H]e definitely 
has too much power. . . . He is judge, jury and executioner when 
it comes to all the discipline. I’m not going to trust any league-led 
investigation, when it comes to anything.”302 
Goodell’s conduct single-handedly affects the NFL’s success—
and thus far, his conduct, as the above demonstrates, seems more 
detrimental than beneficial. If Goodell wants to repair the NFL’s 
public image, he and the NFL Management Council should be open 
to limiting the power he has as “judge, jury, and executioner.”303 
CONCLUSION 
Although the public’s interest in Deflategate was largely based 
in its love of football, Deflategate was a scandal rooted in law. This 
Note analyzed the district court and Second Circuit decisions in an 
attempt to act as the tiebreaker between two federal judges (Judges 
Berman and Katzmann) finding in favor of Brady and two federal 
judges (Judges Parker and Chin) finding in favor of Roger Goodell 
and the NFL. 
But from Deflategate, and the other relevant NFL scandals, a 
question must be raised: is the NFL Commissioner’s authority under 
the 2011 NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement too broad? The 
NFLPA certainly, and rightfully, believes so, and is expected to 
push for a revision to limit the Commissioner’s authority as the bar-
gaining stage for the 2021 CBA approaches. This Note highlighted 
the relevant provisions of the 2011 CBA that will likely be at issue 
during future negotiations and collective bargaining. This Note also 
recommended ways in which the NFLPA could create leverage in 
advance of these negotiations, and explained how the public image 
dilemma that the NFL and Roger Goodell face could and should in-
fluence their approach during negotiations. 
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